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FUNDING LONG-TERM CARE:
SOME RISK-SPREADERS CREATE
MORE RISKS THAN THEY CURE
Nathalie D. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
It is natural to want to fight against nature's most dirty trick, aging,
and its ultimate result, death.' Ironically, it is not death itself that
many people fear most today, but rather that their long-term care costs
will outstrip their assets, leaving them without sufficient funds to pay
for these health care needs.2 Many aging people are asking themselves,
"How will I survive and who will care for me when I cannot care for
myself?" These concerns have seniors scrambling for options to hedge
against this risk.
The number of people concerned with this issue is growing by
leaps and bounds. The population is aging at a rapid rate, due to im-
provements in health care. According to one author, by the year 2030,
eighteen percent of the population will be over age sixty-five.3 These
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1. See Veronica L. Jarnagin, Note, A Call to Action for National Long-
Term Care Reform: Indiana's Private-Public Cooperative as a Model, 29 IND.
L. REV. 405, 407 (1995) (noting that fear of death has been replaced with fear
of living too long).
2. See id.
3. See Erick J. Bohlman, Financing Strategies: Long-Term Care for the
Elderly, 2 ELDER L.J. 167, 168 n.4 (1994). According to Bohlman:
[I]n 1900, 4 percent of the population was age sixty-five
or older. By 1977, 10.8 percent of the population was
sixty-five or older. By 1980, that figure had-increased to
11 percent. Projections are that by 2010, 12.7 percent of
the population will be at least sixty-five, and that by
2030, 18.3 percent of the population will have reached
that age. Within only fifty years, nearly one out of every
five living Americans will be "elderly" by our current
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statistics clarify the obvious: Medicaid cannot fund long-term care for
the entire population. The system will simply go bankrupt if a large
portion of the growing elderly population must rely on the wages of
the working population to fund their long-term care costs. The prob-
lem is that few of the elderly can afford to pay for the astronomical
costs of their own care.4
This Article examines the options available for seniors to finance
long-term care. It specifically explores the options for ensuring that
one's personal funds are not outstripped by future long-term care
needs. No doubt, as baby-boomers age and prepare to move into the
growing senior population, many of them will put their creative ener-
gies to work to come up with successful solutions. We can only hope
that this is true, given that the issue of how long-term care will be
funded in the future is as difficult an issue as any other encountered by
our society.5
Medicare does not cover most homerhealth care or nursing home
stays, and unfortunately, most seniors do not know this. 6 Health care is
standards. Furthermore, the "elderly" as a group are get-
ting older. The percentage of elderly individuals at least
seventy-five years of age will rise from 37.7 percent of
the total elderly population as of 1977 to 42.1 percent by
2030.
Id.
4. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Robert L. Kane et al., Variation in State Spending for Long-
Term Care: Factors Associated with a More Balanced System, 23 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 363, 371 (1998). Concern is widespread about the costs of
long-term care, particularly those paid for with public funds. The framers of
Medicaid certainly never contemplated that it would be used so extensively to
cover long-term care needs of the previously "middle class." See id. Medicaid
was designed to serve the poor, particularly women and children, not frail
"older persons who have become impoverished by health care costs uncovered
by Medicaid." Id. at 368-69; see also Jeffery L. Solterman, Medicaid and the
Middle Class: Should the Government Pay for Everyone's Long-Term Health
Care?, I ELDER L.J. 251, 251-52 (1993). According to Mr. Solterman, the
Medicaid system is facing serious financial collapse, created by rising health
care costs and an exploding elderly population. See id.
6. See Lisa Schreiber Joire, Note, After New York State Bar Association
v. Reno: Ethical Problems in Limiting Medicaid Estate Planning, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 789, 792 (1999) (noting that only about two percent of the eld-
erly's long-term care needs are met through Medicare). Moreover, according
to a survey conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), an alarming seventy-nine percent of AARP members incorrectly be-
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covered by Medicare and a Medicare gap insurance policy that covers
costs not picked up by Medicare (Medigap). 7 Health care is not the
same as long-term care. Health care includes doctor and hospital vis-
its, and medical care for specific ailments.8 Long-term care, on the
other hand, is defined as the need for assistance with two or more of
the following activities of daily living: eating, moving from the bed to
a chair, using the rest room, bathing or dressing. 9 Long-term care in-
cludes providing assistance for these needs, from home-health care, to
minimal health care provided with residential services, to twenty-four
hour nursing care services.' 0 While health care costs are covered by
Medicare and Medigap policies, long-term care generally is not."
lieved that Medicare and Medicare supplemental policies would cover the cost
of nursing care expenses. See Bruce A. Radke, Note, Meeting the Needs of
Elderly Consumers: Proposed Reforms for the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners' Long-Term Care Insurance Mode Act, 1 ELDER L.J. 227,
227 (1993). In reality, Medicare only covers a small portion of all nursing
home stays in the United States, because Medicare and the gap policies that
supplement it only cover short-term post-acute care for persons discharged
from a hospital who need skilled nursing care. See id. at 228. Even then,
Medicare will only cover 100 days of care, not the average 465-day stay in a
nursing home. See id. Gap coverages add nothing in terms of new coverages.
See id. at n.13.
7. See William G. Weissert et al., Cost-Savings From Home and Commu-
nity-Based Services: Arizona's Capitated Medical Long-Term Care Program,
22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1329, 1347 (1997); see also MARSHALL B.
KAPP, GERIATRICS AND THE LAW 63-64 (1992). Medicare Part A, which funds
hospital stays, is funded by payroll tax contributions, whereas Part B, which
funds physician services and outpatient care, is funded by general federal reve-
nue and beneficiary-paid premiums. Medigap insurance, to cover the costs and
deductions not covered by Medicare, can be purchased as well, although the
policies still do not cover long-term care. See Diane Belinkie, Piecing Together
Health Care Protection: Medicare v. Medicaid v. Medigap, 16 FAM. ADVOC.
42, 45 (Summer 1993).
8. See Bohlman, supra note 3, at 170-71. Current annual nursing care
fees range from an average of $30,000 to $70,000 a year. See id.
9. See Janice Cooper Pasaba & Alison Barnes, Elder-Law Symposium:
Article: Public-Private Partnership and Long-Term Care: A Time for Re-
Examination, 26 STETSON L. REV. 529, 537 (1996).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 533. Medicare does provide limited coverage in some cir-
cumstances. Medicare will cover some home health care programs, but will
not pay for many services such as Meals on Wheels or adult day care. See
Bohlman, supra note 3, at 171.. While Medicare provides minimal coverage
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These long-term care costs can be covered in four general ways. They
can be paid for with private funds; 12 paid from private funds as long as
the funds last, and then paid for by Medicaid; 13 or they can be paid
through long-term care (LTC) insurance, a relatively new insurance
product now on the market. 14 These policies are only valuable to the
extent that seniors can afford to continue paying the premiums until
they actually need the care. 15 A fourth option for financing long-term
care is to contract with a continuing-care facility (CCF). 16 Although
this type of arrangement works off a different model, like LTC insur-
ance, it attempts to contain long-term nursing care costs.' 7 This option
allows a person to pay a substantial fee up-front, in exchange for guar-
anteed nursing care for the rest of her life. 18 Continuing-care facilities
for skilled nursing home care, in order to qualify for such coverage, the appli-
cant must require skilled nursing or rehabilitative services on a daily basis.
Skilled services are defined as those which "(1) are ordered by a physician; (2)
require the skills of technical or professional personnel . . . and (3) are fur-
nished directly by, or under the supervision of, such personnel." Id
12. See Bohlman, supra note 3, at 169.
13. See id.; see also Jarnagin, supra note 1, at 407 (noting that few people
actually choose to become paupers to qualify for Medicaid; far more become
paupers as a result of paying for long-term care).
14. See infra notes 66-106 and accompanying text.
15. See id.
16. In 1987, there were between 600 to 700 CCFs serving 100,000 to
200,000 residents. See Eileen J. Tell et al., New Directions in Life Care: An
Industry in Transition, 65 MILBANK Q. 551 (1987); see also Lisa Steams et al.,
Continuing Care Communities: Issues in State Regulation, 8 ST. LOuIS U.PUB.
L. REv. 245, 247 (1989). This proliferation of CCFs resulted in a similar pro-
liferation of writing about CCFs. See Michael B. Floyd, Should Government
Regulate the Financial Management of Continuing Care Retirement Commu-
nities, 30 ELDER L.J. 29, 29 n.1 (1993) (citing over 30 sources written about
CCFs). Most scholars who have written about these facilities call them con-
tinuing care retirement communities or CCRCs. The author prefers CCFs be-
cause these are businesses, not merely "communities" of individuals. See John
E. Fairbanks, Lifetime Care Contracts: Are Senior Citizens Putting All Their
Eggs in One Basket, 4 PROB. & PROP. 4 (Mar./Apr. 1990); Steams et al., su-
pra, at 246; William B. Fisher, Note, Continuing Care'Retirement Communi-
ties: A Promise Falling Short, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 47 (1985).
17. See Floyd, supra note 16, at 38.
18. See Christine A. Semanson, The Continuing Care Community: Will It
Meet Your Client's Changing Needs?, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 771, 775 (1990).
The author uses the female pronoun throughout this Article because most eld-
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provide increased medical care for a person as she ages.' 9 Initially, the
person lives in an independent apartment for which she pays monthly
rent. 20 When additional care is needed, it is provided on site. There is
no need to move out of the complex, thus eliminating reliance on fam-
ily members and others, and providing peace of mind in the future. 21
The purpose of this Article is to explore two different aspects of the
long-term care issue. First, what are the options for receiving long-
term care, such as home-care, assisted living, CCFs or traditional
nursing homes? Second, what are the methods of funding long-term
care? This Article will consider the strengths and weaknesses of each
option when considering how best to control the costs of long-term
care. Because only two of the options, maintaining LTC insurance and
entering into a contract with a CCF, attempt to control future long-
term care costs through risk-spreading, the Article considers these two
options in more detail than other options.
Part I discusses the alternatives to traditional nursing homes.22
Given that over 1,600 of this country's traditional nursing homes have
recently gone into bankruptcy, seniors will be more interested in op-
tions to traditional nursing homes than ever been before. Part II ex-
erly people are women.
19. See id. The goal of the CCF community or "Life Care" community is
to provide an environment in which elderly residents can maintain their highest
level of independence for as long as possible, and also be sure progressive
nursing care will be available for them when they need it. See id. The ar-
rangements ensure elderly persons will have a place to live where they will be
taken care of for the rest of their lives. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 47.
20. See Semanson, supra note 18, at 775.
21. In assisted-living facilities, by comparison, once seniors need certain
levels of care, they typically are required to move out of an assisted-living fa-
cility. See Stephanie Edelstein, Assisted Living: Recent Developments and Is-
sues for Older Consumers, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 375 (1998) (not-
ing that one facility's advertisement touts "you'll never want to move again,"
without disclosing that when a resident's health needs reach a certain level, the
resident is required, by either facility policy or state law, to move out of the as-
sisted-living facility). Moving can be very taxing on an elderly person, which
makes assisted-living a less attractive alternative, at least on one level. Even
moving an elderly person from one room in a nursing home to another can be
frightening and traumatic. See Marilyn Denny, This is Who I Am, Don't Let
Them Move Me, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 203, 204 (1999).
22. See infra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
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amines the issue, in general terms, of funding long-term costs.23 Part
III analyzes long-term care insurance, 24 and Part IV looks at continu-
ing-care contracts.25 In the end, for people who want to avoid running
out of money for long-term care before they die, long-term care insur-
ance and CCF contracts appear to be the only options. At the moment,
however, each provides far less protection against loss than one would
hope.
I. WHERE WILL I LIVE WHEN I'M OLD AND FRAIL?
Most people would probably prefer to live in their own homes their
entire lives, if this were possible.26 As a next choice, most would
probably prefer to live with children or other family members, once
they can no longer care for themselves. This option can make a person
feel guilty about imposing on others, resulting in a loss of independ-
ence. Moving to a nursing home would be most people's very last
choice. However, today there exists many excellent alternatives to tra-
ditional nursing homes.
A. Assisted-Living Facilities
Assisted-living exists as an option to living in a nursing home. In
assisted-living, residents pay rent for a typical apartment and on-sight
services that often include meals, social events, transportation, and
23. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 66-106 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 107-38 and accompanying text.
26. See Radke, supra note 6, at 227; see also The Best Home for Older
Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at A20 (citing an AARP study reporting
that eighty-six percent of the elderly prefer to live in their homes for the rest of
their lives).
27. See Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent
Long-Term Care Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POL. 195, 209 (1996). In today's
fast-paced, mobile society, this option is less available than it used to be. To-
day's modern family is extremely mobile, leaving many elderly people with no
one geographically close upon whom to rely. See Semanson, supra note 18, at
772. Many people are declining to have children, leaving these people without
children's support later in life. See Steams et al., supra note 16, at 253 (noting
that 34 percent of CCF residents in 1989 had no children, a percentage far
higher than the number of persons having no children in the general popula-
tion).
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general housekeeping. 28 Residents can also purchase home-care assis-
tance for their daily needs. 29 Residents pay for services on a monthly
basis without an up-front fee. 30 Because residents pay for the services
as they receive them, these arrangements do not help manage future
long-term care costs in any way. Compared to traditional nursing
homes that also do nothing to contain these costs, assisted-living fa-
cilities are far more pleasant. Those who reside in such a facility can
more or less take care of themselves. Residents live with companion-
ship, freedom and independence.
31
There are between 20,000 and 30,000 assisted-living facilities in the
United States, housing twenty-five percent of the 2.2 million seniors
who live in senior housing. 32 Although these facilities are relatively
new, they are incredibly popular.33 There is a significant downside,
however. Once a resident can no longer take care of herself with rela-
tively little assistance, she is required to leave the facility, typically
for a traditional nursing home. 34 Thus, while assisted-living is a pleas-
ant, though expensive, alternative for many seniors, using this option
nearly always results in future relocation, something few seniors rel-
ish. 35
28. See John Greenwald, Elder Care: Making the Right Choice, TIME,
Aug. 30, 1999, at 54; Edelstein, supra note 21, at 376-77.
29. See Greenwald, supra note 28, at 54; see also Edelstein, supra note 21,
at 373.
30. See Greenwald, supra note 28, at 55.
31. One problem with assisted-living is that there are few guidelines re-
garding which services must be offered to residents. See Edelstein, supra note
21, at 375-77. The important thing in considering this type of care is to ask
plenty of questions and try to find out exactly what is offered, and at what
price.
32. See Greenwald, supra note 28, at 52. This is by far the fastest growing
segment of the senior housing market. See Timothy J. Boyce, Financing Senior
Living Facilities, 10 PROB. & PROP. 23, 25 (1996).
33. Revenues generated by assisted-living facilities are expected to in-
crease from $12.5 billion in 1990 to $30 billion in 2000, providing many op-
portunities for investors to make money. See id. The Marriott Hotel chain re-
cently announced plans to open 300 assisted-living facilities by the year 2002,
up from 92 facilities in April of 1998. See Lisha Wheeler, Assisted Living Fa-
cilities - The Elder Housing Boom, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. 110, 110 (1999).
34. See Edelstein, supra note 21, at 378-79.
35. A similar option, congregate living, allows very independent seniors to
live in shared housing, with separate bedrooms, but with other people around
2000]
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B. Continuing-Care Facilities
The other major alternative to a traditional nursing home is the con-
tinuing-care facility. These facilities combine traditional nursing home
care with independent living, including every imaginable level of care
in between, all at one facility. 36 The facilities themselves can be quite
upscale.3 7 While many CCFs are affordable only by the upper-middle
class, some facilities are within the reach of the middle class as well.
The reason CCFs are expensive is they require the payment of a very
substantial up-front fee in exchange for a guarantee of nursing care
covering a person's entire life. 38 Residents also pay a monthly rental
for their apartment while they are living independently. Monthly fees
are similar to those paid for assisted-living, or perhaps a little less,
39
and increases in these monthly fees are often capped. Up-front fees
vary greatly from state to state, but typically range from $80,000 to
$200,000. 41
Every option has its downside, and the downside for CCFs is quite
with whom to share meals and socialize. Similar to other assisted-living ar-
rangements, however, one can only stay in congregate living for as long as one
can take care of herself. Once a senior needs a higher level of care, she typi-
cally must move into a traditional nursing home. Congregate living actually
offers less "assistance" than assisted-living, so the need to move can occur
more quickly than in an assisted-living facility. See Wheeler, supra note 33, at
110.
36. See Boyce, supra note 32, at 27-28.
37. The fees obviously vary from location to location. In 1980, the aver-
age fee was $35,000 per year. See HENRY E. WINKLEVOSS & ALWYN V.
POWELL, CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES: AN EMPIRICAL,
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS, 34 (Richard D. Irwin ed., 1984). Like most
of life's expenses, these entry fees continue to increase. The current average
up-front fee for entrance into a California CCF is over $800,000. Telephone
interview by Brian Colon, Research Assistant, with Bill Woodward, Chairper-
son of the California State Government Counsel on Insurance, California In-
surance Commission (July 23, 1999). In Connecticut, fees range from $39,818
to $455,900. See CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CONTINUING
CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES V (1997).
38. See Stearns et al., supra note 16, at 246. The CCF contract acts as a
hedge against impoverishment by limiting the costs of long-term care. See id.
39. See id. (noting that monthly fees ranged from $250 to $1,300 in 1989).
40. See id. (reporting that up-front fees ranged in 1989 from $15,000 to
$200,000). Today fees are far higher. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
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significant. Specifically, the large up-front entry fees that residents
pay to live in these facilities are not protected from loss if a facility
becomes insolvent. 4' Thus, residents can lose large sums of money,
even their life savings, when facilities fail financially. 42 Because of
this risk, the CCF industry desperately needs legislation that will force
the facilities to become stronger financially and will better protect
resident fees in the event of insolvency.
C. Home-Health Care for the Elderly
A third alternative to traditional nursing-home care is not really an
alternative. This option, home-health care, essentially postpones the
move to a nursing home, but does not necessarily preclude it. Because
most seniors prefer to stay in their homes for as long as possible, there
is now an enormous market for in-home assistance to the elderly cov-
ering daily tasks of every kind.43 Adult day-care, which provides
41. See infra notes 107-38 and accompanying text.
42. This already has happened to some CCF residents. In Idaho, after one
facility failed, some residents lost their life savings. See Idaho Home Health
and Welfare Committee Minutes, Feb. 22, 1988 (testimony of Lorraine Gun-
derson). According to testimony given to the Idaho legislature, "two [of the]
women who had used life savings for [the new living arrangement] learned that
... they were, in a word, paupers. These were people who had worked and
saved during their younger years in order to be independent." Id. In addition to
the loss of life savings, "the loss in self-esteem to the residents and dread of the
future cannot be calculated in dollars." Id Recent changes in Medicare reim-
bursement policies will almost certainly result in more CCF insolvencies than
ever before. Until recently, Medicare paid unlimited rehabilitation and therapy
for senior citizens in nursing homes and CCFs, but the federal government is
now severely limiting those reimbursements. As a result, huge numbers of
nursing homes are now failing financially, and CCFs can be expected to follow
suit. See e.g., Bruce Jaspen, Integrated Health in Chapter 11, Nursing Home
Chain Blames Reductions in Medicare Spending Growth, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4,
2000, at Al; Gayle Geis O'David, Creditors, Sun Craft Debt Deal,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 27, 1999, at A1; Thomas J. Cole, Troubled Times for
Nursing Homes: Pressing for Cash, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 4, 1999, at AI;
Thomas J. Cole, Troubled Times for Nursing Homes: Awash in Red Ink,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 3, 1999, at A1; Thomas J. Cole, Troubled Times for
Nursing Homes: An Ailing Industry, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 2, 1999; Diane
Scarponi, Some Nursing Homes in State Are Headed for Trouble, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 20, 1999, at B1.
43. See Beatrice S. Braun, M.D., Long-Term Care and the Challenge of an
Aging America: An Overview, 1 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 113, 115-16 (1997).
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structured activities and social interactions for seniors who often can-
not stay home alone all day, is also becoming popular.44 This option is
As this author notes, seventy-eight percent of the population that needs assis-
tance with daily living actually does live in the community, rather than in an
institution. See id. This reflects Americans' preference for remaining in their
homes and aging in place, as well as the immediate need to reform the law re-
garding use of public funds. Currently, public funds can be used only in insti-
tutions. See id.; see also Betsy Abramson, Public & Private Financing, 64
WIS. L. REv. 20, 20 (discussing the need to expand the options for receiving
community-based care).
44. See Craig S. Meuser, Why Government and Business Should Take A
Closer Look at Adult Day Care, 1 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 219, 222 (1997)
(describing adult day care as one of the fastest growing trends in health care,
and citing other authors making the same claim). Curreitly, most people do
not qualify to receive home care through Medicare or Medicaid. Medicare
provides medically necessary intermittent skilled nursing and therapy services
under the Medicare Part A Home Health benefit. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1994).
This is short-term care, however, and is based on acute need. If skilled care is
needed, then non-skilled care, such as help with bathing and other normal daily
tasks can also be obtained through Medicare. Medicaid also provides some
home-health care benefits for people who qualify for Medicaid but who are not
covered by Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994). Because states have some
flexibility in designing their Medicaid benefit plans, some states have less re-
strictive Medicaid home-health care benefits than others. Most of these home-
health services are provided through Medicaid waiver programs, which allow
states to "waive" certain Medicaid requirements to offer alternative benefits.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994); see also Marshall B. Kapp, Health Care in the
Marketplace: Implications for Decisionally Impaired Consumers and their
Surrogates and Advocates, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 18 (1999) (discussing waivers
for home health care). For example, New Mexico offers a Disabled and Eld-
erly waiver program under which a person who qualifies for nursing home care
can receive home and community-based care instead. One of the federal re-
quirements of such a waiver program is that the home care services provided
cost less than nursing home care. In New Mexico, the services that can be pro-
vided under a waiver include nursing, therapies, homemaker, personal care,
and respite care, all provided in the home, or adult day care and assisted living.
See STATE OF N.M. MED. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, dated
June 30, 1998 (copy on file with the author). After the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, however, the home-health care industry is in shambles and can provide
relatively few services to anyone. See Diane Block, Home Health Firm Hit
Skids, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 2000, at Al; Chris Meehan, Abra-
ham Aims to Halt Medicaid Bleeding, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 21, 1999, at
Bl.
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loosely referred to as "community-based care. 45 Community-based
care seeks to avoid sending the elderly to separate facilities. Instead, it
attempts to allow people to age at home. A great deal of optimism ex-
ists about the future of these arrangements and it has sparked a move-
ment to permit more of these services to be paid for by Medicare or
Medicaid. 46 While this prospect seems unlikely given the current sys-
tem, proponents claim that providing community and home-based
services ultimately could be cheaper for taxpayers than traditional
nursing care.47 If this system could be established, people would have
more access to these services through public funding.4' This would be
a great improvement for all but the most medically needy elderly peo-
ple. As it stands now, however, these community-based services are
not covered by Medicare or Medicaid.49 If a senior wishes to use them,
she must pay for the services from private funds or through an LTC
insurance policy.
II. How WILL I FUND MY LONG-TERM CARE?
The funding options for long-term care are not as plentiful as the
housing options. The options basically come in two forms, private and
public. Private funding of home-health care, nursing home care, and
assisted-living is a "pay as you go" proposition. Seniors pay for the
services they need for as long as they need them, and then hope that
45. See Abramson, supra note 43, at 20.
46. See Meuser, supra note 44, at 245-47; see generally Weissert et al.,
supra note 7, at 1329 (suggesting that home-health care might be cheaper than
nursing home care, based on a recent study completed in Arizona); see also su-
pra note 44 (explaining that most people are not sick or poor enough to receive
home-health care services through Medicare or Medicaid).
47. See Meuser, supra note 44, at 239-41 (suggesting that community-
based care might be cheaper than institutional care, and that as a result, allow-
ing more community-based care to be paid for by Medicare and Medicaid
could stave off financial disaster for Americans as a whole); see also Weissert
et al., supra note 7, at 1342-44 (also suggesting that home health care might be
more cost-effective than nursing home care).
48. See Weissert et al., supra note 7, at 1349. Despite indications that
community-based care could be cheaper than nursing home care, many people
believe that making these home-based services available will not save money,
because the demand for the services will increase and drown out the unit cost
savings. See Kane et al., supra note 5, at 363-64.
49. See Omar N. Amhad, Medicaid Eligibility Rules for the Elderly, Long-
Term Care Approach, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 251, 272-73 (1999).
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their life span does not exceed their savings. While the extremely
wealthy have nothing to fear, average middle-class Americans are re-
signed to wish for either a miracle or a hasty demise. Home-health
care can cost from $20,000 to $40,000 or more per year,50 assisted
living can cost $25,000 to $60,000 a year,51 and nursing home costs
average $30,000 to $70,000 a year. 2
There also exists the option of divesting one's self of all assets vol-
untarily 53 to become eligible for Medicaid. It does not appear that vol-
untary divestment abuse is a significant problem.5 4 Given how quickly
50. See Greenwald, supra note 28, at 54 (stating that home care visits can
run $80 per visit); Robert D. Hayes et al., What Attorneys Should Know About
Long-Term Care Insurance, 7 ELDER L.J. 1, 9 (1999) (stating that an all-day
visit for home-health care runs $110 per day).
51. See Greenwald, supra note 28, at 55. (stating that one assisted-living
facility currently costs between $2,850 to $4,800 per month); Dana Shilling,
Securities Funding of Long-Term Care, A Step Toward a Private Sector Solu-
tion, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2 (1991) (stating that home health care costs
can exceed nursing home costs, depending on the level of care needed).
52. See Bohlman, supra note 3, at 169; see also Shilling, supra note 51, at
2 (noting that in some areas on the coasts, nursing home care exceeded
$100,000 per individual per year, even in 1991); Rein, supra note 27, at 210
(nursing home costs ran between $18,000 to $60,000 per year in 1996). At this
rate, paying $100,000 or even $200,000 for a continuing-care contract does not
appear that expensive after all.
53. A common way is through $10,000 bequests to family members,
which are not taxable to the recipient. Aside from permitted gifts, Medicaid
will scrutinize all transfers made within 36 months of eligibility for Medicaid.
If a transfer is made at below market value, Medicaid has the right to take the
value of the asset (less any amount received for the asset) and divide that
amount by the average cost per month of nursing home care. The person will
be ineligible for Medicaid until that amount of time has passed. See Pub. L.
No. 103-66, § 13611(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)).
54. See Radke, supra note 6, at 228. Two-thirds of all nursing home pa-
tients who begin paying for their own nursing home care are impoverished un-
der the Medicaid guidelines within one year. See id. While many people com-
plain that elderly people often voluntarily divest themselves of their assets in
order to qualify for Medicaid, many more people legitimately run out of funds,
despite a desire to pay for long-term care. See Jarnagin, supra note 1, at 412.
For most elderly, asset depletion is no game. It is a frightful reality that can be
as debilitating and frightening as any physical illness. See id. Financial impov-
erishment, and its inherent restrictions on lifestyle and independence, is the
most feared result of the aging process. See id; see also Rein, supra note 27, at
251-52, 255 (noting that most nursing home residents have few or no assets to
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most people's assets are dissipated by paying for nursing care, it is not
surprising that paying for it with private funds seems wasteful on
some level. The private funds often cover a mere fraction of the
costs.55 Yet, emotional debates rage over whether middle-class people
should use Medicaid to cover their long-term care costs. 56 People dis-
agree about whether "Medicaid estate planning" constitutes wise fi-
nancial planning or serious moral transgression. 57 This debate contin-
ues, despite the fact that in 1996, Congress took the unprecedented
step of making it a federal crime to give away assets or to set up trusts
to qualify for Medicaid.58 This provision, nicknamed by opponents as
the "Granny Goes to Jail Law," was actually targeted at sanctioning
lawyers who help people make such transfers. 59 Whether the law will
shield, and that most fit the profile of the old, disabled, widowed and impover-
ished member society).
55. See Radke, supra note 6, at 228.
56. See Solterman, supra note 5, at 289 (arguing that private interests need
to step up to the plate and help fund long-term care, because Medicaid cannot
support, and was never intended to support, the long-term care costs of the
middle class); Rein, supra note 27, at 251-55 (arguing that the middle class is
becoming destabilized as a result of many factors, including increasing long-
term care and other medical costs, and that very few elderly persons actually
divest assets in order to qualify for Medicaid; rather, most divest as a result of
paying for long-term care); Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 543-44 (doubt-
ing that widespread divestment is a serious problem).
57. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 538.
58. See Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 322, 110 STAT. 1936, 2060-62 (1996)
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 132a and 42 U.S.C. § 1395); Amhad, supra note 49, at
272-73. These transfers only constitute a crime if they result in a period of in-
eligibility for Medicaid. If not, no crime occurs. See id. n.148. As a result, if
transfers are made but they still leave an elderly person with the ability to pay
for some nursing care, then the prior transfers presumably will not be crimes.
This provision has been criticized by many as being unduly ambiguous. Sub-
stantial questions remain as to whether "waiting out" the disqualification pe-
riod would prevent criminal sanctions from being imposed. Some argue that
this provision was designed to encourage the long-term health care insurance
industry and to deter attorneys and accountants from advising that an elderly
person spend down their estate or engage in "Medicaid estate planning." See
Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 539. The provision was amended by the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997. See id.
59. See Amhad, supra note 49, at 273. Interestingly, no one knows who
actually added this particular provision to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 STAT. 1936,
2060-62 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 132a and 42 U.S.C. § 1395). Even the
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actually be enforced against an elderly person remains to be seen.
Regardless of these criminal sanctions, transferring away all of
one's assets has formidable downsides.60 First, it is unlikely that many
elderly people actually want to transfer away all their assets. Such a
transfer gives up complete control over where to travel, what to buy,
and how to spend each day. It is a complete step away from independ-
ence, regardless of how much seniors trust their children. 61 This trans-
fer is often irreversible as well. 62 Second, and more importantly, care
received under Medicaid may be inferior to that purchased with pri-
vate funds.63 The more desirable forms of care, assisted-living and
home-health care for example, are not currently covered under Medi-
caid." Moreover, even if traditional nursing care is used, a Medicaid
recipient's choice of nursing care facilities may be severely limited.
Often, the only Medicaid beds available are located in poorly funded
facilities in bad neighborhoods. 65
Assuming neither of these financial risks are acceptable, namely the
risk of running out of private funds for long-term care or the risk of
bill's sponsors, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Nancy Kassenbaum (R-
KS), knew nothing about the particular provision before it passed. See Amhad,
supra note 49, at 273.
60. See Jarnagin, supra note 1, at 407.
61. See id.; see also Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 543.
62. Moreover, some people simply have no one to whom to transfer their
assets, thus making this option unavailable. The combination of impossibly
high costs of private, long-term care, and the requirement of divestment to re-
ceive public care, demoralizes the middle class. See Solterman, supra note 5, at
277-78. It discourages savings and creates hopelessness. See id.
63. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 543 (noting that the quality of
Medicaid services is generally inferior to services available on the private,
long-term care market, particularly when one's choice of a facility is dictated
by the availability of a Medicaid-paid bed).
64. See Meuser, supra note 44, at 224 (noting that home care and adult day
care are not covered by Medicare).
65. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 543. Since the enactment of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, thousands of traditional nursing homes now fall
into the category of "poorly funded." See Jaspen, supra note 42, at Al. This
legislation drastically reduced the amounts received by nursing homes from
Medicare for rehabilitation services to the elderly. Between September 1999
and February 2000, the four largest nursing home chains in this country filed
for protection under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. Today, over
1,600 of America's nursing homes, serving over 175,000 residents are in bank-
ruptcy. See id.
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simply living with the care provided by Medicaid, many seniors (and
seniors to-be) are desperately seeking ways to spread the risk of loss
of long-term care. Purchasing and maintaining LTC insurance or en-
tering into a continuing-care contract are the only options currently
available to address the financial risk of aging beyond one's savings.
III. THE WEAK LINKS IN LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
The same law that threatened to send Granny to jail, the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 66 gave purchas-
ers of some long-term care insurance policies certain tax benefits for
buying the policies.67 The payments made for the policies are excluded
from taxation, as are many of the benefits paid under the policies.68
Initially, Congress passed this law to induce people to find affordable
alternatives to funding long-term care. 69 The rationale being that if
more people were to take out these policies, fewer would need to re-
sort to Medicaid for long-term care. Medicaid funds then could be re-
served for the truly needy.
The idea of purchasing insurance to cover the costs of long-term
care is excellent in theory, but problematic in practice. One problem,
with no obvious cure, is that very few people can actually afford to
purchase and maintain LTC insurance premiums. 70 A typical policy
66. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 STAT. 1936, 2060-62 (1996) (codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 132a and 42 U.S.C. § 1395). For an excellent article on long-
term care insurance, see Robert D. Hayes et al., What Attorneys Should Know
About Long-term Care Insurance, 7 ELDER L.J. 1, 11-27 (1999) (containing the
most recent information about the options available for long-term care insur-
ance, as well the Medicare and Medicaid payment schemes).
67. See Nancy L. Johnson et al., Long-Term Care Financing: Federal
Policy Implications, Actions and Options, I QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 139, 147-
49 (1997) (outlining the various tax benefits contained in the Act). These
benefits became effective in January 1997. See id. at 148.
68. See id. at 147.
69. See id.; Bohiman, supra note 3, at 171 (remarking that long-term care
insurance can be an insurable event altering financial planning strategies).
70. See Radke, supra note 6, at 230; Braun, supra note 43, at 117. Some
scholars believe many more people can afford the policies than those that actu-
ally buy them. See Marc A. Cohen, Nancy Kumar, Thomas McGuire & Stanley
S. Wallach, Financing Long-Term Care: A Practical Mix of Public and Pri-
vate, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 403, 408-09 (1992). According to these
authors, it is not the high cost, but the other undesirable attributes relating to
these policies, such as the absence of guaranteed premium levels and misrepre-
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that contains meaningful but basic coverage and benefits can cost a
sixty-five year old between $2,600 and $7,000 a year.71 According to
one study, only twenty-five percent of consumers in any state could
72afford basic, long-term care insurance. 2 Even those policies that are
affordable today may not be affordable in the future because rates can
continue to rise as a person ages.73 This is true even if the policies pur-
port to have aflat premium rate.
Policies also vary so significantly that many consumers have no
idea what they are buying. Unlike Medicare and Medigap insurance,
these policies can cover many different levels of long-term care over a
variety of periods of time.75 The policies sometimes cover home-
sentation by salespersons about the policies, that account for their lack of
popularity. See id. at 403, 412.
71. See Radke, supra note 6, at 230 (noting that premiums can run up to
$7,000 per year, though not indicating the age to which such a premium would
apply); Braun, supra note 43, at 117 (quoting rate of $2,600 for a 65 year-old
person).
72. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 9, at 72 n.542. Moreover, as these
authors note, 80 percent of the elderly cannot afford to pay premiums on these
types of policies. Just about everyone who has studied the issue agrees that the
policies are just not affordable.
73. While some commentators suggest that consumers buy the policies
when they are younger, the age of a person does not seem to make a great deal
of difference in time of purchase. By the time a person reaches a certain age,
the policy premiums could become too high to afford, regardless of when the
policy was purchased. See Rein, supra note 27, at 286. Unlike term insurance
policies, the costs for which also continue to rise, LTC policies end up being a
complete waste of money. See id. At least term life insures against unexpected
death, which could actually happen to a person. By contrast, LTC policies fre-
quently lapse before any benefits are paid and the very event against which one
is insuring, old age, is the same event that causes the policies to lapse before
they pay benefits. See id.
74. See Cohen, supra note 70, at 405; see also Solterman, supra note 5, at
283 (noting that insurers always reserve the right to increase premiums, but
only on a class basis for all policyholders of a given state); Jane Bryant Quinn,
Is a Backlash Brewing in LTC, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1999, at 39.
75. See Bohlman, supra note 3, at 186-88; Radke, supra note 6, at 228-30;
Braun, supra note 43, at 117. Six months to six years is a typical coverage for
nursing home care. See Radke, supra note 6, at 230. However, many policies
severely limit the amount of coverage available for home-health care. Typi-
cally, consumers can only use a percentage of the policy for home-health care,
such as fifty percent of the policy's total dollar value, and may also have to pay
a twenty percent co-pay for home health care services. See Solterman, supra
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health care services, but often plan holders can only use a portion of
the policy's dollar value for home-health care.76 Most policies are in-
demnity plans that reimburse a set dollar amount of benefits for each
day of care." There is typically a waiting period of up to 100 days,
during which time consumers must pay for nursing care before the
policy can be used. 78 These waiting periods are similar to deductibles
on other insurance policies. While some of the policies provide that
these different levels of care can be received in a variety of home and
institutional settings, consumers need to read the policies extremely
carefully. Not all policies are this flexible. The best policies on the
market offer the consumer the greatest number of ways to use the
policy when the time arrives. Most of the products on the market,
however, do not offer all of these options.
7 9
Some policies cover rehabilitative care for temporary medical con-
ditions, custodial care for long-term nursing care needs, and residen-
tial in-home care.80 One large benefit to these policies is coverage of
treatment in settings other than traditional nursing homes. Consumers
are particularly drawn to insuring future home-health care costs. How-
ever, not every policy actually covers home-health care, and most
policies that do cover this type of care place severe restrictions on the
use of the policy in this way. 81 Naturally, the policies that offer the
greatest number of care options are also the most expensive, because it
is far more expensive for insurers to pay benefits for these more desir-
able options.s2
note 5, at 283.
76. See Solterman, supra note 5, at 284.
77. See id. While Mr. Solterman claims in his Article that many newer
policies have shorter waiting periods, this depends on whether the consumer
has paid extra for this feature. See id. at 283.
78. See id.
79. See Radke, supra note 6, at 235 (noting that one woman's claims were
denied because she did not receive care at the right "type" of facility); see also
Bohlman, supra note 3, at 187 (noting that products vary so much tfiat it is dif-
ficult to determine exactly what your policy covers).
80. See Radke, supra note 6, at 231.
81. See id. Consumers must be careful to ensure that their policies actu-
ally cover home care, if that is a feature they want. See Solterman, supra note
5, at 283.
82. See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. Other things that make
the better policies more expensive include high daily pay-outs and shorter
waiting periods. See Radke, supra note 6, at 232.
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While there is no question that exorbitant rates keep people from
buying LTC policies, insurers that carry the policies claim that the
high rates are unavoidable. Two risks, adverse selection and induced
demand, are the reasons insurers cite for the high rates. 83 Adverse se-
lection occurs when policies are purchased primarily by people ex-
pecting to need nursing care, not by the general population. This fills
the pool with high-risk individuals, increasing the costs of premiums.
8 4
The other risk, induced demand,85 results in what some call the
"woodwork effect." 86 Those who would not normally use the offered
services essentially come "out of the woodwork" to use the services,
merely because they are available. 87 Long-term care policies are medi-
cally underwritten and insurers have found ways to contain their costs
for long-term care. These cost-containment methods include increas-
ing waiting periods, excluding many pre-existing conditions from cov-
erage, requiring prior hospitalization before benefits can be received
under a policy, setting upper age-limits for policy holders, and pro-
viding fewer benefits for non-institutional care. 8
Needless to say, these cost-containment measures take away many
of the benefits provided by these policies. One way that Medicare
contains costs for long-term care is by requiring that a person be hos-
83. See id.; see also HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 219 (4th ed.
1995). Those at a higher risk of needing insurance are those most likely to
purchase it. See id. This can defeat the purpose of allocating the risk by insur-
ing across a larger pool of people. See id. Another creative alternative, referred
to as Social Health Care Maintenance Organizations, proposes to expand HMO
coverage to include long-term care. See Shilling, supra note 51, at 23. Unfor-
tunately, adverse selection in choosing these policies is predicted to make this
option too costly for many people as well. See id.
84. See Radke, supra note 6, at 232-33.
85. See ROSEN, supra note 83, at 219. People may be less willing to avoid
risks and assume a less healthy lifestyle. This is sometimes called "moral haz-
ard." See id. There is the possibility that consumers of LTC insurance will
over-consume health care because the costs of care have been deferred, creat-
ing a drain on the industry. See id.
86. Kane et al., supra note 5, at 371.
87. See id. It is easy to see how a person might seek assistance with home
or personal needs, whether they really need the help or not, if her long-term
care policy reimburses for such services. Over-consuming long-term care,
particularly home-health care, can be seen as a form of moral hazard. See supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
88. See Radke, supra note 6, at 230.
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pitalized just prior to receiving long-term care. 89 However, because
over two-thirds of those who enter a nursing home are not coming
from a hospital, 90 their expenses are not covered by Medicare, and
would similarly not be covered by many LTC insurance policies. In-
creasing waiting periods means that seniors still have to spend their
nest eggs on nursing-home care, despite purchasing the policies. Ex-
cluding services for preexisting conditions will further limit the num-
ber of services covered by the policy and reduce the policy's value.
Finally, some policies that are sold cannot be renewed past a certain
age.9 1 While most states now forbid the sale of any LTC policy that is
not non-renewable, this is not required in all states. Thus, it is impor-
tant to be sure that any policy purchased is indeed renewable.
The combination of confusing and almost endless variables, along
with the failure of salespersons to clearly explain LTC policies, leads
89. See Bohlman, supra note 3, at 171.
90. Requiring a previous hospital stay is one way that Medicare keeps its
costs down, consequently, consumers need insurance for long-term care that is
not preceded by a hospital stay.
91. As Mr. Solterman points out, consumers can sometimes pay extra for a
feature called "guaranteed renewability." See Solterman, supra note 5, at 283.
Fortunately, 36 states now require any LTC policy sold in their state to be re-
newable. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.53.020 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1691.02 (West 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-97-208 (Michie 1992);,
CAL. INS. CODE § 10233.2 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-19-107 (West
1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7105 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.9407
(West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-42-6 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OH-
107 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 41-4605 (1998); 215 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/351A-4
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-12-9 (West 1992); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 514G.7 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2228 (1993); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.14-615 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1736 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 5075 (West 1999);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3907 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
62S.04 (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.955 (West 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-4513 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23A-6 (Michie 1999); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-55-30 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-45-05 (1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.44 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4426
(West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.655 (1998); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
991.1105 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-34.2-6 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 58-17B-5 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-42-105 (1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-1405 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5203 (Mi-
chie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 33-15A-6 (1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 26-38-105
(1999).
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to tragic abuses. 92 One elderly woman spent over $50,000 on thirty-
one long-term care policies, all of which lapsed over a three-year pe-
riod. 93 A ninety-five year old took out a policy years ago for $1,100
and paid on it diligently.94 He was ultimately forced to drop the policy
when the premium reached $8,200 a year, and he could no longer af-
ford it.95 Another woman purchased a policy because she was prom-
ised that if she had to go to a nursing home, she would never be a bur-
den to her children. 96 Although she paid more than $5,000 in premi-
ums, her carrier denied the first claim for reimbursement because the
place she chose to live did not qualify as a "skilled-care" provider as
required by the policy. 97 Apparently, the policy limitations were never
actually explained to her.
Industry representatives certainly paint a rosier picture of these
plans and insist that elderly people can afford the policies.98 As one
web page announces, "you will pay less in long-term care insurance
premiums in your entire life than you would pay for one year of nurs-
ing-home care."99 This is true when considering that most people can-
not afford to pay either the average $40,000 cost to stay in a nursing
home for a year or the LTC insurance premiums. Most premium own-
ers indeed pay much less than that for their LTC policies, however,
many of the policies lapse before ever being used. 00
Purchasing both inflation protection and the option of guaranteed
renewability are the two most important things that a senior can do to
improve the chances of buying a useful policy. While guaranteed re-
92. As Bruce Radke outlines in his article on LTC risks, stories of abuse
are rampant. See Radke, supra note 6, at 234-35.
93. See id. at 234.
94. See id.
95. See id. In 1996, the average income of people over age 65 was just
$16,684 per year. See Jill Uylaki, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Should
We Rethink Priority Status For the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?, 7
ELDER L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Mark E. Battista & Brigette Emmons-Touchette, Covering the Fi-
nancial Risk of Long-Term Care: Responding to the Myths, I QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 175, 175 (1997) (insisting that LTC insurance is for everyone,
young and old).
99. Phyllis Shelton, LTC Consultants (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http:
//www.ltcshelton.com/csmrpgs/csmrfms/csartset.html>.
100. See Rein, supra note 27, at 286-87.
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newability is required in some states, where it is not required, this
feature as well as inflation protection, is available through policy rid-
ers. These options are available through policy riders that cap the
amount premiums can increase and also guarantees that the policy-
holder retains the right to renew the policy. 0' An astronomically large
percentage of LTC policies lapse before they are used, perhaps in part
because consumers are not purchasing these riders. 0 2 Yet, insurance
salespeople do not push inflation protection. Some agents cross off the
provisions while others simply do a poor job explaining them. 0 3
Salespeople may discourage consumers from purchasing this protec-
tion in order to "keep the costs down.' 0 4 Without inflation protection
and guaranteed renewability, however, most policies are not worth
101. See id at 288. These are often two different riders, so an individual
must ask exactly what any rider covers. Other important things consumers
need to consider when choosing an LTC policy include: the types of care cov-
ered, the length of the waiting periods, the duration of time during which one
can receive benefits of various kinds, any requirements regarding prior hospi-
talization, excluded pre-existing conditions, the total dollar-value of the policy,
the daily benefits compared to the costs of various care in one's community to-
day, whether some kinds of care require consumers to pay a deductible, and
whether the whole dollar value of the policy can be used for one form of care,
or whether instead policy use is limited in some way. Inflation protection is
sometimes called "future purchase option." See Hayes et al., supra note 50, at
22.
102. See Rein, supra note 27, at 286-87. In the area of home care, the mis-
representations are more widespread and harder to spot
A Florida agent pushing Medico's home-care policy tried
to sell a $100 daily benefit instead of a $70 plan. If you
go above $70, you can get people to come in and clean,'
he advised. 'I have a lot ofcihents who like someone to
change their sheets and comb their hair. You're not going
to get that for $70 a day. A $70 benefit buys only the
medical things; $100 allows the agency to give you some
things for health and comfort.' Policyholders may not get
their sheets changed, vacuuming done, or their hair
combed, even for $100. According to a sales brochure
the agent left, the policy covers only nursing care service
... medical and health related services ... prescribed by
a physician.
Id. at 290.
103. See id. at 298.
104. See id. The author suspects that some agents do not mention these op-
tions because they would make the policies too expensive. Salespeople also
may not want to alert people to the fact that these policies might become non-
renewable, or that inflation could diminish the value of the policy.
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much to the consumer.
Whether the problems with LTC insurance can be cured depends
primarily on whether insurance carriers can find a way to make the
policies affordable, while at the same time improving the products
enough to make more people want to buy them. Current policies are
too expensive and provide little in the way of benefits in any event.
10 5
If the policies no longer require hospital stays, fail to exclude so many
medical conditions, and are subject to strict caps on rate increases,
perhaps more consumers would buy them. The question remains, how-
ever, whether insurance companies can actually sell a useful long-term
care product at a rate that people can afford. 10 6
Legislation regarding LTC insurance that will better balance the
needs of seniors and carriers should be enacted. This could create a
larger market for these products. These insurance products already
have a bad reputation, and before becoming useful they need to be im-
proved to meet consumer demands. It is unquestionably in everyone's
interest to relieve the strain on Medicaid in any way possible.
IV. THE RISKS OF CONTINUING-CARE CONTRACTS
The continuing-care contract, which has already been described in
some length above, is a product that needs to be improved. These ar-
rangements have many benefits, and with a few improvements, could
accomplish many things for many people. A continuing-care contract
105. See Radke, supra note 6, at 247.
106. An optimistic movement is afoot in some states which would allow
people to purchase long-term care products now. If they are unable to continue
to carry them, the state will pay Medicaid benefits for them later. See David J.
Guttchen, The Connecticut Partnership for Long-Term Care: A Public/Private
Partnership to Finance Long-Term Care, I QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 155, 156
(1997). Under an initiative recently enacted in Connecticut, participants can
qualify for Medicaid without completely divesting themselves of all assets, as
long as they carry long-term care insurance for a certain period of time. See id.
Residents are allowed to shield one dollar's worth of asset for every dollar
spent on long-term care insurance, assuming they later need to go on Medicaid
because the policy has lapsed. See id. The general goal of the program is to
improve the quality of long-term care policies by insisting on certain benefits
in the eligible policies, to improve public perception of these policies, and to
reduce the state's burgeoning Medicaid costs. See id. at 158. It is too early to
tell if public/private initiatives like this will improve these policies or improve
the financial condition of Medicaid over the long-term, but at least people are
thinking about solutions.
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allows an aging person to pre-pay for nursing care, in a lump sum fee,
and to live in a pleasant, independent environment prior to needing
nursing care. Continuing-care contracts are designed to achieve three
goals: (1) allow older people to live independently for as long as pos-
sible, (2) avoid making seniors move to a different facility as their
medical needs increase, and (3) allow them to insure against the risk
that their nursing care needs will outstrip their available funds. People
choosing this option could someday be assured that they will receive
increased medical care as they age, a place to live for the rest of their
lives, and complete assurance that they will be taken care of, regard-
less of their future financial condition.
10 7
The benefits of such an arrangement are obvious because the "in-
surance" component is one of the most desirable attributes. 08 Most
continuing-care contract holders are guaranteed a future level of
nursing care, ranging from full nursing care into the future with little
or no increase in the monthly payments, to guaranteed nursing care up
to a certain dollar cap, to virtually no nursing care except that paid for
in cash at the time services are rendered. 10 9 Moreover, all levels of
care are provided at one facility, eliminating the need to relocate later.
Before entering into such an arrangement, or suggesting that a client
do so, seniors must first come to terms with the financial reality of
these arrangements. Pre-payment for any service is risky, but here the
stakes are often life savings. Elders must pick facilities carefully,
based on their current and future financial health. To do this, they
must know what to look for.
Seniors must be attuned to how CCFs are financed and the various
ways they spend residents' up-front entry fees. Unfortunately, finan-
cial vulnerability is a very real concern in the CCF field, a field which
has been notorious for financial failure."0 These failures are easily ex-
107. "Someday" is used because these products currently present many
risks to consumers. See infra notes 109-138 and accompanying text.
108. See Marc A. Greene, Life Care Centers: A New Concept in Insurance,
48 J. RISK& INS. 403, 410 (1981).
109. See Steams et al., supra note 16, at 246-47 (noting that in 1987, about
sixty-four percent of all CCFs charged an up-front fee and thereafter guaran-
teed certain long-term, continuing-care services at little or no extra cost).
110. According to one 1988 study, one-third of the facilities studied suf-
fered from either negative net income or negative net worth. See Hirsh S.
Ruchlin, Continuing Care Retirement Communities: An Analysis of Financial
Viability and Health Care Coverage, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 156 (1988). As one
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plained by the structure of the financial relationship between the CCF
and its residents. Residents are charged up-front fees based on physi-
cal exams and amortization schedules."' These fees are used for a
number of things, including building facilities for new CCFs and im-
proving existing facilities for established CCFs."12 How these entrance
funds are managed will in large part determine the financial health fa-
would expect, facilities that offered full nursing care, at essentially one up-
front cost, were in the worst financial condition. See id. In a well-known
magazine article, one author noted that of the fifty CCFs that were financed
with tax exempt bonds since 1980, ten percent defaulted on their debts, and
fourteen percent failed to meet their occupancy rates. See Denise M. Topol-
nicki, The Broken Promise of the Life Care Communities, MONEY, April
1985, at 150.
111. There are numerous different financial models through which life care
can be arranged or "purchased," though most arrangements do include an up-
front fee. These fees ranged from $15,000 to $200,000 in 1990. See Fairbanks,
supra note 16, at 6. While it is recognized that using actuarial information is
critical to charging residents a sufficient up-front fee, few CCFs actually hire
the professionals necessary to properly use such actuarial information. See
Steams et al., supra note 16, at 256; Howard Winklevoss, Continuing Care
Retirement Communities: Issues in Financial Management and Actuarial Pre-
diction, in CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES 57, 61-62 (1985),
few CCFs actually hire the professionals necessary to properly use such actu-
arial information. As Dr. Winklevoss noted, the burning question about the fi-
nancial liability of CCFs is a follows:
Is it possible to have a life care community with only 300
residents and, based on predictions of their life expectan-
cies, financial projections and fee setting structures, to
make the system work? The industry has been claiming
for many years that it does not have the data, the infor-
mation or the methodology to answer this question. Well,
those excuses are no Ion ger valid because our book sets
forth all the ABC's of the actuarial end of the [CCF]
business.
Id. at 58.
112. See Floyd, supra note 16, at 37 (noting that entrance fees may provide
capital to build a new facility or to upgrade an existing facility). CCFs can use
up-front fees to finance new facilities, assuming these fees had to be invested
for the future health care needs of residents. It seemed far more appropriate to
finance new construction through the more typical means, such as conventional
or tax-free bonds. This industry is considered too risky to generate much inter-
est in the lending or tax-free bond markets. See Steven R. Eastaugh,
FINANCING HEALTH CARE 181 (1987). Most states require very little reserves
from the up-front fees, and only twenty states require any reserves at all. See
infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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cilities."13 Another factor in financial health is the balance between up-
front fees and monthly fees." 4 Unless investments are extremely suc-
cessful, large up-front fees cause facilities to rely on resident turnover
to stay afloat. 1 5
The financial goal of CCFs should be to set money aside from en-
trance fees to meet the future needs of residents. 116 In the past, how-
ever, many facilities have used the proceeds of new contracts to meet
113. A portion of the up-front fees "may go to fund the residents' future
nursing care needs." Floyd, supra note 16, at 37. Where most of the fees are
paid up front, however, it is absolutely critical to a CCF's survival that it set
aside a large percentage of the up-front fees for residents' future long-term
care. See id.
114. While not all CCFs charge a monthly fee, in addition to the up-front
fee, a failure to charge such a fee should raise a "red flag" for residents. See
Fairbanks, supra note 16, at 7. Regardless of how accurate an actuarial analy-
sis is, inflation and other unpredictable factors require a facility to be able to
make adjustments to its cash flow based on future circumstances. See id.
CCFs can make up for insufficient up-front charges by increasing their
monthly charges, which ranged in 1989 from $695 to $1,000, depending on the
size of the unit. See id. Of course, if monthly fees go up too much, residents
will have lost one of the primary benefits of their CCF contracts, the ability to
limit future expenses. See Floyd, supra note 16, at 38 (noting that high en-
trance fees could outstrip residents' ability to pay and thus remove much of the
benefit of such a contract in the first place). Out of fairness to residents, some
states regulate fee increases by restricting the frequency and the increments of
such increases, similar to the way rent control statutes control costs in land-
lord-tenant situations. See Fairbanks, supra note 16, at 6.
115. See Floyd, supra note 16, at 38.
116. If CCFs are going to serve their populations, up-front fees must be re-
served or set aside for the future needs of residents. See Winklevoss, supra
note 111, at 59. Fifteen states require that a portion of the up-front fees be
placed in reserve for future use, so they are not depleted by short-term con-
struction and other needs. In many states, pre-occupancy payments must be
escrowed and released according to a set schedule. See id. These statutes may
not sufficiently protect residents, however, because the required reserves are
far too small and, moreover, the CCFs need not maintain the reserves for very
long. See id
Very few state statutes actually require that reserves be set up to handle
future obligations. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. While the
AAHA recommends that CCFs establish a reserve fund equal to the annual
principle and interest payments on all debt service, plus enough to cover two to
six months of operating costs, only fifteen state statutes require any reserves
whatsoever. See id.
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current obligations to existing residents. 117 Facilities cannot view sur-
plus cash as profits, given these costs are essentially defined financial
obligations.' As Dr. Winklevoss, an expert on CCFs, has aptly ex-
plained:
A major problem in the financial management of a life
care community is the very deceptive nature of the in-
come and cash flow of these communities over the first
decade and a half of their existence. When you open up
a community, you get a tremendous influx of funds in
the form of entry fees, while the health care utilization
of the residents admitted does not accelerate for about
, 10 or 15 years. What that means is that the overseers of
that community have to have enough patience and for-
titude to reserve the monies that they are receiving
during the first 10 years until there is an inevitable in-
crease in health care utilization. Lack of reserves has
been a big problem. As was noted above, when com-
munities start out they have quite a bit of money, health
care utilization is low, and they run the finances of the
community in such a way that the amount of money
coming in equals the amount going out. Thus, a sub-
stantial hidden liability begins to build up. Then if they
should have a minor adverse experience, such as a cash
flow problem, they find out that there is a tremendous
unfunded health care liability, which is very difficult to
remedy financially. 119
117. While several of such instances are noted in Fisher, supra note 16, at
47, the most notorious case involving a failure to reserve is In re Pacific
Homes, Inc., I B.R. 574 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979). Pacific Homes was a CCF
originally formed to take care of retiring Methodist ministers. It eventually
expanded its facilities to serve almost 1,900 people in seven facilities located
in four states. Residents could pay for their services in one of three ways: total
up-front cash fee, transfer of all assets, or up-front fee plus a monthly fee. See
Fisher, supra note 16, at 50. In the vast majority of the CCF contracts in place,
residents paid no monthly fee, making the facilities dependent upon reserves
and sound investments for continued viability. Thus, when Pacific Homes be-
gan directing its capital toward expansion, speculative investment and financ-
ing its resulting operating losses, its financial condition crumbled. It began
entering into new CCF contracts to finance not just operating expenses but also
losses, creating a "Ponzie scheme" that ultimately resulted in bankruptcy. See
id. at 51.
118. See Winklevoss, supra note 111, at 59-61.
119. Id at 59-60.
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Because of their pre-paid structures, CCFs are particularly suscepti-
ble to insolvency.120 Once insolvency occurs, the prospects for resi-
dents can be grim. In Idaho, after one facility failed, some residents
lost their life savings. 121 When a provider fails financially, it has a
number of legal options, none of which are very helpful for residents.
First, the facility can cease its operations and hope the state provides
for the transfer of the residents. 22 Second, it may file for a state insol-
vency proceeding, which will normally require liquidation, but may
also permit a home to stay in business and reorganize its debts in some
way. Third, it could file a federal bankruptcy petition, which has one
immediate advantage for the facilities over state proceedings, namely
a regular method of reorganizing under the provisions of Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 123 Under Chapter 11, the provider can continue
to operate without the immediate appointment of a trustee and will re-
ceive the benefits of specialized bankruptcy provisions that aid reha-
bilitation.
24
If reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code makes
rehabilitation easier for a debtor facility, it obviously does so at the
expense of other parties. One of the primary benefits a debtor obtains
in bankruptcy is the ability to reject pre-petition contracts, including
those executed by CCF residents, for which some residents may have
paid their life savings. Pre-payment for anything is risky, but the
risks of pre-payment are particularly great for parties to continuing-
care contracts. Residents whose contracts are rejected receive only
bankruptcy claims for their losses, which are typically paid at ex-
tremely low rates, and for which replacement services cannot be ob-
120. The financial health of a life-care provider will depend upon as many
factors as any other business, as well as on the provider's accuracy in predict-
ing the nursing care costs and life span of residents, investment success, and
ability to jump through the necessary hoops to obtain various federal funds.
See Floyd, supra note 16, at 40-44.
121. See Idaho House Health and Welfare Committee Minutes, Feb. 22,
1988 (testimony of Lorraine Gundersen).
122. Florida, for example, covers some of the costs of moving residents to
another facility, from a general state fund. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 651.119
(West 1996).
123. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
124. See id.
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
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tained.
26
Increased risks for continuing-care residents have caught the atten-
tion of state legislatures, who have enacted a variety of state statutes
to address them. 27 While the precise goal of enacting legislation is to
protect residents from the loss of the savings, many statutes do not
achieve this goal. It is therefore necessary to draft improved legisla-
tion that will protect the rights of CCF residents, even in the face of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed by their facility.'
28
While these problems are admittedly large, people around the coun-
try have begun to work hard to solve them. Thirty-six states have en-
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). Section 365(g) treats the breach as a pre-
petition breach by the debtor. See id. The nondebtor party then becomes a
creditor, as defined in Section 101(10)(B). See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10)(B). Sec-
tion 502(g) then classifies the nondebtor party's rejection damage claim as a
general unsecured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
127. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1801-1812 (West 1990); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-93-101-114 (Michie 1992); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE §§ 1770-1793.62 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-13-
101-12-13-119 (West 1991 & West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
17a-360-375 (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4601-4605 (1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 651.011-651.125 (West 1996); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 33-45-1-
33-45-12; IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2750-67-2764; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2, para.
4160-2-12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-4-1-4-24
(West 1989 & Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 523.D1-523.DI4 (West
Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2231-40-2238 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2171-51:2188 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, §§6201-6226 (West 1990); MD. CODE ANN., Art. 70B, §§ 7-15 (1989);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 76 (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.810-
554.844 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80D.02-80D.20 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1993); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 376.900-376.950 (1986 & Supp. 1992); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420-D:1-420-D:27; N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-
330-52:27D-360 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-17-1-24-17-18
(Michie 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4600-4622 (McKinney Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-64-1-58-64-85 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
173.13 (West 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4423 (West 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101.010-101.160 (1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3224
(West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-59-1-23-59-17 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-11-10-37-11-140 (Law, Co-op Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-
1305 (1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 246.001-246.117 (West
1992);VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2.4900-38.2.4917 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 8001-8018 (Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ (West
1993).
128. See id.
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acted legislation regulating the industry: 129 Moreover, while this leg-
islation is not as protective of residents as it should be, work on im-
proving this legislation to better protect resident fees against insol-
vency has been occurring. The first step to improving these statutes is
to enact legislation in all states requiring CCFs to reserve a portion -
hopefully a large portion - of resident fees for future care. While re-
serving entrance fees for future nursing care costs is virtually the only
way to preserve ongoing financial viability in this industry, 130 only
fifteen states currently require facilities to do so, and most of these re-
quirements are far from stringent.1
3 1
The most common reserve provisions require that the facility re-
serve, on a current basis, an amount equal to the principal and interest
payments due during the next twelve months for any first mortgage or
other long-term financing of the facility. 132 These statutes require re-
serves to sufficiently cover long-term debt for one year, but do not re-
quire reserves for ongoing operating expenses for any period. 133 Some
states do require reserves for some minimal operating expenses. For
example, Florida requires that a facility set aside operating reserves in
an amount equal to thirty percent of the total operating expenses pro-
jected in the facility's feasibility study for the first twelve months of
operation. 34 These operating expenses must only be reserved during
the start-up phase and most financial failure occurs after this period.
States that require reserves for ongoing operating expenses only man-
date them for two or three months.
135
129. See supra note 127.
130. See Winklevoss, supra note 111, at 58-60.
131. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1804; ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-
111; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1775; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-13-
107; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.035; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6215; MD.
CODE ANN., art. 70B, § 11; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80D.06; Mo. REV. STAT. §
376.945; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:8; N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:27D-339;
OR. REV. STAT. § 101.060 ; 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201; TEX. HEALTH&
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.077; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8009.
132. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1806; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80D.06; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.077.
133. See id.
134. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.035.
135. When calculating reserves, New Hampshire adds that portion of two
months' operating expenses that relate to life care residents, and Oregon adds
operating expenses for three months. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:8;
OR. REV. STAT. § 101.060. Still, having secured status in the first place is
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Some state statutes also require CCFs to take other steps to improve
their financial condition or protect resident entry fees. For example,
some states require CCFs to procure surety bonds to protect these
fees. 136
better than nothing. Holding a statutory lien provides some negotiating power,
unless, of course, the statutory lien is only effective upon bankruptcy or insol-
vency. Other states have developed alternative reserve methods. Pennsylvania
requires each facility to hold the twelve months' worth of debt service pay-
ments in reserve, or ten percent of the projected annual operating expenses of
the facility, whichever is greater. See 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3209
(1998). Vermont's and New Jersey's statutes are similar. Vermont requires
the equivalent of a year's principal and interest payments or purchase inflation
protection and to purchase the option of guaranteed renewability or fifteen per-
cent of annual operating expenses, whichever is greater. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 8009. New Jersey requires the same yearly equivalent or fifteen per-
cent of the projected annual operating expenses of the facility, exclusive of de-
preciation. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-339. Colorado's statute re-
quires that each facility maintain reserves equivalent to the next eighteen
months' principal and interest on those debt obligations that are collateralized
by the provider's facility. It also requires a balloon payment, plus an amount
equal to the next twelve months' principal and interest for all other debt obli-
gations that are collateralized by the provider's facility, plus an amount not less
than twenty percent of the facility's operating expenses for the immediately
preceding year. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-107. Other states base the re-
serve requirements on the actuarially determined annual refund amount, see
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-111, which is based on the amount residents have a
right to receive, in cash, if they die or leave the facility. Again, this figure is
not based on what is necessary for the long-term survival of the facility, and
constitutes a far lower number than what would support the operations of the
facility over the long term. The most effective statute by far, and the only one
that requires reserves in amounts sufficient to support the facility over the long
term, is Maine's statute. The law requires that each provider's reserves must
equal the excess of the present value of the future benefits promised under the
continuing care agreement over the present value of the future revenues and
any other available resources, based on conservative actuarial assumptions. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6215.
136. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1774 (for employees and agents
with access to substantial amounts of funds); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-45-4 (re-
quiring a compliance bond of not less than $10,000); IDAHO CODE § 67-2756
(requiring a surety bond, reserves, or a letter of credit or other financial ar-
rangement in undesignated amount, to establish financial security); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-11-40 (requiring a surety bond, reserves, or a letter of credit or
other financial arrangement in undesignated amount, to establish financial se-
curity). Michigan's statute states that the state may require a bond if necessary
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Other statutes require ongoing actuarial studies. 37 Like the reserve
provisions, however, these provisions are underutilized in the state
continuing-care statutes. If they were required more frequently and a
facility liquidates, the surety bonds would help pay for residential care
to be received elsewhere. The actuarial studies would keep the facility
informed of deteriorating financial conditions so it could attempt to
reverse them. The reserve requirements, more than any other require-
ment, would help avoid insolvency entirely by forcing facilities to
prepare for a strong financial future. These goals are all extremely im-
portant and this subject matter is clearly worthy of more state legisla-
tion.
Enacting statutes that require reserves of entrance fees, procurement
of surety bonds, and ongoing actuarial studies, would unquestionably
improve the financial health of CCFs. In addition to taking these steps,
states also should enact valid statutory liens in favor of residents that
will protect them if insolvency occurs anyway. While additional leg-
islation can be proposed to further protect CCF residents' up-front en-
trance fees, taking these two steps alone would greatly improve the fi-
nancial viability of this industry.
Continuing-care contracts may still provide valuable benefits to
some.elderly people. The most important thing residents may do to
protect themselves is visit desirable facilities, talk to other residents,
and then talk to management about the facility's use of residents' fees,
as well as its financial condition.
It is also important to realize that future nursing care could be very
costly for the facility. Consequently, it is probably best to avoid fa-
to protect residents. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 544.816.
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1807 (requiring an actuarial
study at least every three years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17b-527, (annu-
ally); IDAHO CODE § 67-2754; (five years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §
6223 (annually); MD. CODE ANN., art. 70B, § 11 (three years); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80D.025, (annually, to establish reserves); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
4604 (annually); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.114 (five years).
South Carolina requires a summary of an actuarial report to be updated every
two years and New Mexico's statute provides that providers must produce an
annual disclosure statement which must include, for those communities that
charge an entrance fee that were not in operation on the effective date of the
Continuing Care Act, an actuarial analysis of the community performed by an
actuary experienced in analyzing continuing care communities. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-11-30; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-4.
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cilities with unbelievably low rates. While none of these precautions
can ensure that a person will be protected if her chosen facility be-
comes insolvent, 138 few things in life are certain anyway. Entering
into such a contract may well be worth the risk. Better yet, if the sen-
ior can wait a few years, regulation in this area is likely to improve
greatly.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States population is aging rapidly, and as a result, the
options for senior housing have expanded far beyond the traditional
nursing home. Many of the new options allow seniors to live active,
independent lives, far more easily than in the past. As the human life
span expands, however, many people have lingering concerns about
financing this future care. Unfortunately, the options for financing fu-
ture nursing care are less plentiful than the living arrangements. The
simple reality is that long-term care is incredibly expensive, whether it
is paid for privately or publicly. Both of the currently available op-
tions for spreading the risk of these costs, long-term care insurance
and continuing-care contracts, create their own financial risks. It is
time to take steps to improve these options, as well as create additional
ways to spread the risk of long-term care.
138. Given that there is no way to guarantee that an entrance fee will be
protected if a facility becomes insolvent, these arrangements are best for peo-
ple who can afford to pay the entrance fee at a stable facility and have money
remaining.
